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COMPLYING WITH AUSTRALIAN AND 'PATA' TRANSFER PRICING 
DOCUMENTATION RULES - A SISYPHEAN TASK?1 
 
 
Michelle Markham* 
 
 
The multiple, highly nuanced, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations of the arm's-length 
standard reflected in the substantive transfer pricing rules and administrative requirements of 
various jurisdictions impose significant compliance burdens on taxpayers. Indeed, adherence 
to the arm's length standard and administrative practices of a single jurisdiction is more art 
than science.2 
 
It is one thing to beat your chest and scare people into compliance. But tax law is so 'absurdly 
complex' that both taxpayers and tax officers have trouble understanding it.3 
 
 
 
Introduction: Local and International concerns with transfer pricing documentation 
requirements 
 
International transfer pricing, essentially the pricing of intercompany transactions between international 
associated enterprises and the determination of the amount of income to be allocated to each party, is 
one of the most important international tax issues facing a multinational enterprise (MNE) in the 21st 
century. A corollary of the significant increase in global trade, especially via international inter-affiliate 
transactions, has been a rise in government concerns with the loss of potential tax revenue.  Many tax 
authorities around the world are now aware of the necessity of safeguarding their tax base through 
stringent transfer pricing documentation rules and concomitant penalties for failure to comply with 
these rules, and Australia has proved to be no exception. 
 
The Ernst & Young 2003 Global Transfer Pricing Survey 4 , conducted biannually since 1997, 
confirmed trends identified in earlier surveys.  Among these were the fact that transfer pricing is the 
major international tax issue facing MNEs and tax administrations alike, and the fact that the 
compliance aspects of transfer pricing outweigh other aspects in importance.5 Although MNEs have 
witnessed an era of economic uncertainty and a decline in the pace of expansion following the events 
of September 11, 2001, inter-affiliate trade has continued to maintain its significant role in the 
international economy. At the same time, revenue authorities around the world have been stepping up 
their efforts to scrutinise transfer pricing transactions. There has been an increase in audits as well as 
                                                          
1 This is an adaptation/extract from the forthcoming Kluwer Law International publication 
The Transfer Pricing of Intangibles, Michelle Markham (author), due for publication in 2005, 
© Kluwer Law International.  
*BA, LLB, LLM (Natal), H.Dip.Tax (Witwatersrand), PhD (Bond); Advocate of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa.  
2 Letter submitted on September 5, 2002, by TEI President Drew Glennie to Carol Dunahoo, 
Director of International for the Internal Revenue Service, and Tom Crowe of the 
International Directorate of Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, commenting on a transfer 
pricing documentation package developed by the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators 
(PATA), 1-2. See: <http://www.tei.org/PATA.html>.  
3 'Taxman's next targets' June 30, 2004. The Age, quoting Wolfers S, Tax partner with the 
Australian legal firm Thomson Playford. 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/06/30/1088488000233.html?from+storylhs$oneclick
=true 
4 Ernst & Young  Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey: Practices, Perceptions and Trends in 
22 Countries Plus Tax Authority Approaches in 44 countries. 
5 Casonovas C et al, 'Ernst & Young 2003 Global Survey: Transfer Pricing Is Once Again #1 
With a Bullet' 15 Journal of International Taxation 10, 10. 
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more aggressive legislative enforcement efforts, including increasingly burdensome transfer pricing 
documentation requirements and the imposition of onerous penalties for non-compliance with these 
requirements. In the US, for example, it has been said that: 
 
In effect, Congress has transferred the burden of conducting a transfer pricing audit to 
taxpayers, has required that inter-company transfers be supported with complete 
documentation and has backed up these Regulations with heavy penalties.6 
 
Closer to home, Michael Carmody, the Commissioner of Taxation, has commented that: 
 
Transfer pricing has been an area of Tax Office focus for some time and with globalisation 
and the significant increase in related party cross border transactions this will continue. Since 
1999 we have undertaken more than 400 transfer pricing risk reviews and completed nearly 
100 audits resulting in $615m additional tax and penalties being raised.7 
 
Australia was in fact one of the first of the world's major economies to introduce effective transfer 
pricing rules.8 In the past, MNEs in Australia merely set their transfer prices. Now they face onerous 
documentation rules, harsh penalties, and an increased risk of audit. Where the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) does not agree with an MNE's transfer pricing policy, as is increasingly the case, this can 
lead to lengthy and expensive disputes. The Australian Tax Office is becoming internationally 
renowned for being "among the most aggressive in pursuing transfer pricing audits."9 
 
The Commissioner has further commented that in relation to the ATO's 2004-05 Program, the plan is to 
use just over 50 per cent of its budget on compliance, with around two-thirds of this amount being 
directed at 'active compliance'10, in other words on risk identification and resulting reviews, audits, 
investigations and prosecutions. The number of staff engaged in active compliance in 2004 is up by 
600 over the previous year. The aggressive review and enforcement of transfer pricing documentation 
regulations forms part of this focus on taxpayer compliance, and is clearly on the rise in Australia. 
 
The arm's length standard 
 
In an international context, tax compliance practices are developed according to each country's own 
domestic legislation and administrative procedures, therefore each country enforces its own specific 
documentation rules and regulations, as well as its own particular penalties for non-compliance. At first 
glance, a unifying theme is that these competing enforcement regimes have introduced transfer pricing 
documentation requirements that enforce compliance with the internationally accepted arm's length 
standard. This standard has been endorsed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in its Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and National 
Tax Administrations (the 'OECD Guidelines'), introduced in 1995. 
 
In Australia the term 'arm’s length' appears in Division 13 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936 (Division 13).  Division 13 applies to both residents and non-residents, and refers to the arm's 
length consideration as determined by the Commissioner.11 
                                                          
6 Connors P J and Patton M F 'United States: New Transfer Pricing Penalty Regulations 
Require Immediate Action To Avoid Overvaluation Penalties' (October 1994) 48 Bulletin For 
International Fiscal Documentation 529, 532.  
7 'Large Business And Tax Compliance A Corporate Governance Issue' Leader's Luncheon 
Address by Michael Carmody Commissioner of Taxation, 10 June 2003, Sydney, NSW 5. 
8 Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey, above n 4, 4.  
9 Levey M M and Balaban D, Baker & McKenzie, New York 'Global Documentation - Many 
Considerations?' (October 6, 2003)  44 BNA Tax Management Memorandum 1, 7.  
10'The 2004-05 Compliance Program' Michael Carmody, Commissioner of Taxation, Address 
to the Chatswood Chamber of Commerce 17 August 2004, Sydney, NSW, 2.  
11 Section 136AD(1) provides 
Where: 
(a) a taxpayer has supplied property under an international agreement; 
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Although the term 'arm's length' is utilised, no definition of the term is provided in the legislation. 
However, the ATO offers the following explanation:  
 
The arm's length principle uses the behaviour of independent parties as a guide or benchmark 
to determine the allocation of income and expenses in international dealings between 
associated enterprises. It requires a comparison between what the taxpayer has done and what 
a truly independent party would have done in the same or similar circumstances.12 
All OECD countries comply with this so-called arm's length standard, but the problem is the lack of a 
single definition that is utilised on a global basis, and thus there are national variations on its 
application. This lack of consistency is understandably a source of confusion to MNEs. While the 
OECD provides a general framework for transfer pricing legislation or rules, no two countries have 
synonymous transfer pricing rules. MNEs are thus compelled to comply with differing transfer pricing 
rules and documentation requirements in the countries in which they do business - a time-consuming 
and costly procedure. 
 
It is evident that in recent years, the US regulations, as well as transfer pricing regulations in other 
OECD countries (such as Australia), have come to rely more heavily on self-assessment and related 
documentation requirements, thus placing the burden of transfer pricing compliance on taxpayers. In 
1999, the Australian Ralph Report recommended that Australia's international transfer pricing rules be 
modified to apply on a self-assessment basis.13 This is part of an ongoing trend: since 1986 Australia's 
tax system has been one of voluntary compliance, based on self-assessment. Because Australian 
transfer pricing rules are currently not part of the self-assessment system, they have not been drafted 
with sufficient clarity and certainty to facilitate voluntary compliance. A move to self-assessment could 
thus be a positive step forward in devising clear and user-friendly legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(b) the Commissioner, having regard to any connection between any 2 or more of the parties 
to the agreement or to any other relevant circumstances, is satisfied that the parties to the 
agreement, or any 2 or more of those parties, were not dealing at arm's length with each 
other in relation to the supply; 
(c) consideration was received or receivable by the taxpayer in respect of the supply but the 
amount of that consideration was less than the arm's length consideration in respect of the 
supply; and 
(d) the Commissioner determines that this subsection should apply in relation to the taxpayer 
in relation to the supply, 
then, for all purposes of the application of this Act in relation to the taxpayer, 
consideration equal to the arm's length consideration in respect of the supply shall be 
deemed to be the consideration received or receivable by the taxpayer in respect of the 
supply.  
12  Australian Taxation Office (1998)  International Introduction to Concepts and Risk 
Assessment 1. 
13 See: Review of Business Taxation Report - A Tax System Redesigned, July 1999 ¶ 22.12, 
hereinafter referred to as 'The Ralph Report'. The commentary on this recommendation states 
that: 'Consultation and submissions supported this approach …and indicated that many 
businesses currently self-assess in practice. This is despite the current provisions formally 
requiring the Commissioner to exercise a statutory discretion to apply an arm's length 
consideration to dealings which have been undertaken on a non-arm's-length basis and that 
reduce Australian revenue (that is, where profits have been shifted offshore). This 
recommendation is consistent with the general self-assessment structures of the income tax 
law.' Interestingly, a further comment made was that: 'Some submissions also raised the 
question whether self-assessment for transfer pricing should extend to non-arm's length 
dealings that increase Australian revenue (that is, where profits have been shifted to 
Australia). This is not internationally accepted practice and is not recommended. Countries 
typically only provide for a reduction in their tax revenue as a result of transfer pricing 
adjustments through DTAs.' 
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In any jurisdiction, the transfer pricing documentation requirements and the penalties imposed for non-
compliance are of necessity inextricably connected.  However, transfer pricing compliance practices 
and penalties differ widely according to the characteristics of the tax system involved, and the OECD 
cautions that care should be taken in comparing different national penalty practices and policies.14 
Documentation requirements which may be regarded as fair and reasonable in one jurisdiction may be 
regarded as unnecessarily cumbersome and detailed in another jurisdiction, depending on a host of 
different factors, including the number of MNEs in the particular jurisdiction, the overall compliance 
measures taken, the judicial system, the sophistication of the revenue authorities, etc.  The OECD also 
makes it clear that the information relevant to an individual transfer pricing enquiry depends on the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case at hand, making it impossible to make generalisations as 
to the precise extent and nature of information that it would be reasonable for a tax administration to 
require.15 
 
Tax jurisdictions may adopt a number of different types of penalties - there is no uniform penalty. As a 
general rule, compliance is promoted through civil rather than criminal sanctions in OECD Member 
countries, and typically a monetary sanction is involved. The OECD warns that it is difficult to 
evaluate in the abstract whether the amount of a civil monetary penalty imposed is excessive.16  
 
While the OECD offers advice to revenue authorities concerning their national documentation rules, it 
also encourages both tax administrations and taxpayers to commit themselves to greater international 
levels of cooperation in addressing documentation issues.17 This is seen as a concrete way of curtailing 
the need for excessive documentation, while still providing sufficient information for the application of 
the arm's length principle. There is a growing realisation that revenue authorities could save themselves 
and taxpayers time and money by adopting a global standard for transfer pricing documentation. New 
legislation setting out clear and workable rules would form an appropriate starting-point for an 
internationally harmonised regime. 
 
Australia is part of a new initiative to seek a common understanding on transfer pricing documentation 
requirements between four nations. A multilateral transfer pricing documentation package has been 
proposed by the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA). The PATA members are Australia, 
Canada, Japan and the United States. This package has been developed in response to taxpayer 
comments on the increasingly burdensome task of understanding and satisfying the differing 
documentation requirements in each jurisdiction. According to the Australian Assistant Commissioner: 
'In effect, the PATA Documentation Package creates a voluntary procedure which, if satisfied, will 
protect the taxpayer from otherwise applicable transfer pricing documentation penalties, if any, in each 
of the four jurisdictions.'18  
 
 
The problems encountered with Australia's national practices in the transfer pricing documentation 
realm require careful consideration, along with the possible advantages and disadvantages flowing 
from the PATA Agreement, released in March 2003.  
 
Transfer pricing documentation requirements in Australia, and the penalties for non-compliance 
 
In Australia, a penalty tax may be imposed under Division 13 where a transfer pricing adjustment is 
made.19 If the arrangement was entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of reducing or eliminating 
tax, a penalty of 50% of the tax avoided must be paid. If the taxpayer had a reasonably arguable 
                                                          
14 OECD Guidelines ¶ 4.19. 
15 Ibid ¶ 5.16. 
16 Ibid ¶ 4.24. 
17 OECD Guidelines ¶ 5.29. 
18  Lewis D V Assistant Commissioner, International, Competent Authority, Australian 
Taxation Office, Letter entitled:  'PATA Transfer Pricing Documentation Package Draft For 
Consultation' 17 June 2002. 
19 Transfer pricing adjustments are made where a revenue authority decides that an enterprise 
has not accurately reflected their taxable income from an inter-affiliate transaction. 
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position, this is reduced to 25% of the tax avoided. The Commissioner must find that the adjustment 
relates to a 'scheme' under Part IV A (the anti-avoidance provision). In other cases, a 25% penalty is 
imposed, or a 10% penalty where the taxpayer has a reasonably arguable position.20 The magnitude of 
the penalty is thus related to the taxpayer's culpability regarding the reasonableness of its compliance. 
The problem is that no definition of reasonableness is provided, either in Division 13 or in ATO rulings, 
and the taxpayer is in effect left 'shadow-boxing' with a nebulous requirement.  
 
According to one Australian transfer pricing partner: 
 
Businesses - particularly smaller to medium sized enterprises already struggling with the 
weight of tax paperwork - are frankly worried. The increase in information demands from the 
ATO is becoming a real burden to them in terms of cost, time and the difficulty of matching 
the output from their accounting software, systems and procedures to the regulatory 
requirements.21 
 
A survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers recently revealed that 97 per cent of businesses surveyed 
believed that the burden of complying with Australia's transfer pricing regime has increased 
significantly in the last five years.22 
 
The message that the increasingly burdensome documentation and penalty requirements is sending to 
MNEs is that supplying the ATO with sufficient information regarding dealings with associated 
enterprises is vital in order to avoid penalties, and it is up to the taxpayer to estimate the lengths they 
need to go to establish the arm's length nature of their transactions. From the taxpayer point of view, 
there is pressure on MNEs to be strategic in their preparation of transfer pricing documentation. They 
must decide how much information should be supplied to revenue authorities, and whether separate 
documentation tailored to national priorities and requirements should be drawn up, or whether a single 
global analysis should be performed for all the regions involved in the inter-affiliate transaction. 
International transfer pricing practitioners have pointed out that: 
 
Merely preparing documentation, whatever the format or scope, may allow an MNC 
[multinational corporation] to avoid penalties, but it must be observed that preparation of 
documentation by no means assures that tax deficiencies will not be assessed. The point 
simply stated is that, from any documentation perspective, sometimes too much can be as 
problematic as too little."23 
 
Schedule 25A Documentation 
In examining whether an MNE has adopted the arm's length standard, the ATO looks for 
documentation arising when the transaction was entered into, known as 'contemporaneous' 
documentation. Maintaining such contemporaneous documentation is no easy task, even for a large 
MNE with enormous resources at its disposal. Detailed and complex regulations must be adhered to, 
and there are many pitfalls to be avoided. Keeping up-to-date, accurate and in-depth records of a 
plethora of details regarding all aspects of transfer pricing transactions is an difficult task - certainly not 
one that can be adequately fulfilled by maintaining records established in the ordinary course of 
business of an MNE. 
 
                                                          
20 See TR 98/16 'Income tax: international transfer pricing - penalty tax guidelines', Part A 
Transfer pricing penalties. 
21 James L transfer pricing partner with PricewaterhouseCoopers, in 'Tax compliance burden 
& audit risk leave business vulnerable to ATO pressure' (23 April 2002) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 1.  
22  Edwards S National Leader, Transfer Pricing with PricewaterhouseCoopers, in 
'International tax initiative offers 'win-win' for business and the ATO' (18 July 2002) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 1.  
23 Levey and Balaban, above n 9, 3. 
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However, such data is required in terms of Division 13, according to Australia's Double Taxation 
Agreements and also in relation to section 262A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Taxpayers 
who are involved in international transactions with related foreign entities are required to lodge an 
additional tax form, the Schedule 25A, with their annual return.24 The information requirements of this 
Schedule have been described as 'onerous.'25  
 
 
The Schedule requires taxpayers to, inter alia, list the four principal methodologies used by total dollar 
value of revenue derived and expenses incurred. (Transfer pricing methodologies are a means of 
determining arm’s length prices in respect of cross-border transactions).  Twelve methodologies are 
listed, with the proviso that 'not all the methodologies are considered to provide an arm's length 
outcome, but may be arm's length in some cases.'26 Supporting documentation is also to be provided. 
 
In choosing a methodology for the determination of arm's length pricing, the ATO envisages a '4-step 
process', namely: 
 
• Understanding the cross-border dealings in the context of the taxpayer's business - that is, 
characterisation 
• Selecting the most appropriate methodology or methodologies 
• Applying that methodology 
• Establishing review and adjustment processes. 27 
 
The ATO acknowledges that the first two processes may be complex, but declines to offer guidance in 
the Schedule in relation to characterisation and selection. The taxpayer must not only go through these 
steps, but also provide adequate documentation to demonstrate how and why these steps were taken. 
Taxation Ruling 98/1128 states that the most important aspects of characterisation are the identification 
of the scope, type, value and timing of international dealings with associated enterprises in the context 
of the taxpayer's business, and a functional analysis, ascertaining the most economically important 
functions, assets and risks and how these might be reflected by a comparable price, margin or profit on 
the dealings. The problem is that the documentation requirements to achieve this are not only extensive, 
but may prove difficult to establish.  
 
The ATO makes it clear that in documenting their choice of method to determine arm's length pricing, 
the prudent taxpayer will not only document the processes of characterisation of the cross-border 
dealings and the selection of the appropriate methodology, but also the reasons for the final choice of 
method and the reasons why other methods were considered and rejected.29 It is therefore assumed that 
taxpayers will undertake the burdensome task of applying more than one methodology to their 
transaction, and documenting each application. This is in direct contrast to the approach taken by the 
OECD Guidelines, which explicitly state that the arm's length principle does not require the application 
of more than one method.30 The complexity of the dealings is supposed to indicate the extent to which 
analysis and supporting documentation is required, and therefore no guidelines are provided as to what 
will constitute adequate documentation in any particular situation. 
 
                                                          
24  TR 98/11 'Income tax: documentation and practical issues associated with setting and 
reviewing transfer pricing in international dealings' ¶ 2.7. 
25 Elliott J 'Transfer Pricing: Lessons from Australia' Discussion Papers in the Department of 
Management Number 97-135 University of Southampton, 1997 13. 
26 Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 5, 9. The pricing methodologies listed are as follows: 
Comparable uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost plus method, profit split 
method, transactional net margin method, marginal costing, cost contribution arrangement, 
apportionment of costs, apportionment of income, fixed mark-up applied to cost, fixed 
percentage of resale price, other arm's length methods. 
27 Ibid 6. 
28 TR 98/11, above n 24, ¶ 5.18. 
29 Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 4 Choice of method to determine arm's length pricing, 
8. 
30 OECD Guidelines ¶ 1.69. 
 7
Furthermore, the applicability of the chosen pricing method will usually require two separate processes 
involving firstly an assessment of comparability, and secondly the collection of supplementary data. 
The assessment of comparability includes: 
 
• Searching for comparable transactions or enterprises 
• Identifying sources of information used in the search 
• Adopting transactions or enterprises as being comparable 
• Rejecting other transactions as not being comparable 
• Providing reasons and amounts where an independent enterprise has been adjusted to 
make it comparable with the dealings under examination, and 
• Applying the pricing method, and any checking method - such as sampling - to ensure the 
validity of the chosen method and resultant arm's length price.31 
 
This first process involves a rigorous assessment of the search for comparable transactions. In reality, 
revenue authorities as well as taxpayers often have difficulty in obtaining sufficient information about 
comparable transactions to properly apply the arm's length principle. A substantial amount of data may 
be needed to evaluate uncontrolled transactions and their similarity to the transactions of associated 
enterprises. With the globalisation of corporations, and as the trend towards mergers and acquisitions 
continues, the availability of comparable transactions is becoming increasingly problematic in certain 
industries.32 This search may prove to be an arduous one, especially where the inter-affiliate transaction 
concerns assets for which no comparables are readily ascertainable, such as high-profit or unique 
intangibles.  
The Schedule 25A instructions offer no guidance as to what the prudent taxpayer should do in this 
situation. The question arises as to why it is necessary to compel the taxpayer to spend time 
documenting why certain transactions are not comparable, rather than concentrating on those 
independent transactions where comparability is possible. Perhaps the ATO might heed the concerns 
voiced by the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (EU JTPF) in its 2003 Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Paper as to whether taxpayers and tax authorities have conflicting or congruent interests.33 The Forum 
concluded that both sides have an interest in limiting pointless enquiries, which, quite apart from the 
frustration that is often involved, waste the resources of both parties. It made the point that if: 
 
"tax authorities regard a documentation requirement as a cheap and effective way of 
generating all the information they might conceivably require then the interests of the two 
sides will conflict. Taxpayers object when they are forced to spend resources on exercises of 
limited or questionable relevance to their tax liability."34 
 
Following the assessment of comparability, the ATO specifies that the second process, namely the 
collection of supplementary data, should involve the assembly of data on profit projections and the 
creation or acquisition of records to supplement the analysis of comparability and function.35 It should 
also include the collection of data used to calculate financial performance ratios, as part of the 
application of the chosen pricing methods. The taxpayer is expected to prepare and retain relevant 
documentation in relation to both of these processes. 
 
                                                          
31 Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 4 Application of pricing methods 8. 
32 Wright D R 'Transfer Pricing in the United States: Recent Events and Expectations for the 
Future' 55 Bulletin For International Fiscal Documentation (Sept/Oct 2001) 417, 425. 
33 EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum - Business Representatives Transfer Pricing 
Documentation Discussion Paper Doc.JTPF/014/BACK/2003/EN ¶ 2.6 
34 Ibid. 
35 Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 4 Application of pricing methods 8.  
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Taxpayers are further warned in Taxation Ruling 94/1436 that the Commissioner is under no obligation 
to sanction the methodology they finally select and document unless, on an objective analysis, it 
produces the most accurate calculation of the arm's length consideration in the particular case. In 
selecting and documenting the most appropriate methodology, they must recognise that Australia 
should not be denied its fair share of tax, but also that a fair share does not necessarily mean a result 
that produces the highest amount of Australian tax, or a result that produces the most favourable 
taxation outcome for the MNE. The most relevant and practical advice given is that the most 
appropriate method will be the one that produces the highest practicable degree of comparability. 
However, the proviso is added that there will be unique situations and cases involving valuable 
intangibles where it is not practicable to apply methods based on a high degree of direct comparability. 
No further guidance is given on the procedure to be adopted in these circumstances. Considerable 
difficulties thus arise when an MNE involved in, for example, intangible asset transactions has to 
document exactly why its chosen methodology is appropriate, given the lack of direct comparability 
inherent in such transactions. 
 
 
It is to be hoped that the ATO will take note of the OECD's encouragement of tax examiners to take 
into account the taxpayer's commercial judgment about the application of the arm's length principle, so 
that the documentation supporting the transfer pricing analysis is tied to business realities. In fact, the 
OECD suggests that tax examiners should take as a starting point in their transfer pricing analysis the 
perspective of the methodology that the taxpayer has chosen in setting its prices.37   
 
As mentioned above, applying and documenting the chosen methodology will require the separate 
processes of a) an assessment of comparability and b) the collection of supplementary data. Finally, 
processes for review and adjustment to the chosen methodology should be provided by the taxpayer, in 
the event that the ATO deems such alterations to be necessary. Although following this approach is not 
compulsory, according to the ATO, where taxpayers properly develop, implement and document these 
four steps they are less likely to expose themselves to transfer pricing adjustments.38 Few taxpayers 
would rashly disregard following this 'non-compulsory' approach, thereby leaving themselves open to 
the above-mentioned penalties imposed for the lack of a 'reasonably arguable position'. 
 
Practitioners are concerned that Schedule 25A could be used to target certain taxpayers for audit, 
according to the methodology or methodologies selected, and the documentation provided to 
substantiate this choice. In practice, subsidiaries may bargain with the parent company rather than use 
an approved methodology, but in order to comply with documentation requirements and not arouse 
undue ATO interest they are compelled to carry out extensive and expensive (non-value-added) 
reviews of their pricing to demonstrate compliance with Schedule 25A requirements.39 There is some 
irony here, as 'real bargaining' is often taken as a sign of the arm's length treatment of a transaction. 
 
In early 2003 it was reported that the ATO had announced that it would be reviewing more than 500 
taxpayers and that it may select a company based on its transfer pricing disclosures in its Schedule 25A, 
where it did not measure up to the ATO's risk assessment model.40 A tax practitioner observed that in 
his view, many smaller businesses fell into the trap of believing that documentation created as part of 
ordinary business operations, and used to set prices, would satisfy the ATO.41  
 
Unfortunately, the ATO does not specify the extent of the documentation required, other than to state 
that it 'does not expect taxpayers to prepare or obtain documents beyond the minimum needed to make 
a reasonable assessment of whether they have complied with the arm's length principle in setting prices 
                                                          
36 TR 94/14  'Income tax: application of Division 13 of Part III (international profit shifting) - 
some basic concepts underlying the operation of Division 13 and some circumstances in 
which section 136 AD will be applied' ¶ 344.  
37 OECD Guidelines ¶ 4.9. 
38 TR 98/11, above n 24, ¶ 5.4. 
39 Elliott 'Transfer Pricing: Lessons from Australia', above n 25, 15. 
40 Fenton-Jones M 'Offshore Dealings Under Scrutiny' Australian Financial Review March 4, 
2003. 
41 Ibid quoting BDO partner Cameron Allen. 
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or consideration.'42 Without specific guidance as to revenue interpretation of the terms 'minimum' and 
'reasonable', this statement is too vague to be helpful. Documentation created in the ordinary course of 
the taxpayer's dealings to establish prices in international related party dealings, such as invoices and 
orders, are not regarded as evidence of the arm's length nature of such prices, so taxpayers are 
compelled to create documentation over and above this. No checklist of documentation that would be 
adequate or desirable is provided, the ATO maintaining that this will depend on the individual facts and 
circumstances of each case, with taxpayers using their commercial judgment according to what a 
prudent business person would do in such circumstances.43 
 
It is worth noting the EU JTPF's comments that every day commercial judgements are exercised by 
hundreds of business managers within MNEs, on the basis of proper economic and commercial 
conclusions with respect to the profitability and cost price calculations necessary to maintain the 
business.44 It observes that these decisions should not have to be documented beyond what is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the business, as this is not only impractical but adds no economic value to 
the business. It further advises that a great deal of wasted time and effort could be spared if transfer 
pricing documentation requirements were in line with the normal reporting/accounting systems 
required for proper management and compliance with annual financial reporting regulations. 
Additional information should only be requested where this is strictly necessary, as it may be of no 
material value to the revenue authorities. This seems to be an eminently sensible approach that takes 
into account the needs of both tax authorities and taxpayers, and provides food for thought regarding 
the Australian documentation requirements. 
 
In Australia, practitioners are also concerned about the 'contemporaneous' nature, or timing of the 
preparation of the documentation. The Transfer Pricing Partner for Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has 
commented that taxpayers who conduct post lodgement prudential reviews and create documentation 
of a non-contemporaneous nature will not be safe from penalties, adding that taxpayers who have made 
the effort to create such documentation should not face penalties in addition to any proposed 
adjustments: 'while we acknowledge that the ATO's aim is to encourage companies to get their 
documentation in order, the lack of reduced penalties in relation to non-contemporaneous 
documentation…may be seen as a disincentive.' 45  
 
In addition, if the documentation supplied by the MNE is incomplete, ie if it lacks sufficient supporting 
evidence of an arm's length methodology, the taxpayer will find it difficult to avoid the imposition of 
penalties. Under this self-assessment system, the onus is on the taxpayer to supply all the necessary 
documentation on intrafirm transactions, and to ensure compliance with the arm's length principle. A 
study conducted by the ATO in 1999 revealed that most companies do not meet revenue documentation 
requirements, and a decision to increase audit activity has been made by the Commissioner.46 It is 
submitted that a move by the ATO to clarify what revenue's requirements are would go a long way to 
solving this problem. 
 
 
Recommendation Addressing the Problem of the Lack of Simplicity, Ease of Administration, 
Fairness and Clarity of Documentation/Penalty Rules 
 
A general recommendation that penalty provisions should be simple, easy to administer, fair and clear 
may be seen as an idealistic but impractical response to the issue at hand. Experience has demonstrated 
that simplicity is almost impossible to achieve: inter-affiliate transfer pricing transactions are inherently 
complex transactions, necessitating a detailed examination involving extensive documentation 
individually tailored to a particular taxpayer's operations and transactions in order to determine whether 
an arm's length price was paid. Complex legislation and rules regarding documentation are rarely easy 
                                                          
42 Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 4 Adequacy of documentation 7. 
43 Ibid.  
44 EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, above n 33, 1-2. 
45 Goldner D 'ATO Adopts 'No Fault--No Penalty' Line to Transfer Pricing' Press Release 5 
November 1998 < http://www.deloitte. com.au/library/677.asp>.  
46 'Tax Office Steps-Up Action On Transfer Pricing', Media Release - Nat 99/36 5 July 1999 1.   
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to administer, but some suggestions can be made which will simplify administration and reduce the 
costs of monitoring transfer pricing transactions in the long term. Finally, fairness and clarity, perhaps 
the two most important characteristics required of taxation regulations, are not impossible aims, and 
some suggestions will be made to this end. As these criteria are often inter-connected, they will be 
discussed together. 
 
The problems associated with the lack of clarity of documentation rules can be discussed on two levels: 
on a general basis and on a specific basis applicable to individual taxpayers. 
 
Clarifying rules on a general basis 
In Australia there is a lack of clarity as to the specific nature and extent of transfer pricing 
documentation required: the guidelines provided are at too high a level of generality. It is 
recommended that the ATO outline more specific requirements, as it is obviously extremely 
dissatisfied with the level of documentation to date. This is reflected in the following statement from 
the Commissioner of Taxation:  
 
I am concerned in particular about the very poor level of documentation we found in the 
record reviews of 190 companies to evidence the arm's length nature of their transfer pricing 
activities…Only one company was assessed as having high quality documentation to support 
its transfer pricing with its offshore associates, while 84 per cent of companies examined had 
documentation that was inadequate in some way. 47 
 
From the taxpayer point of view, the uncertainties associated with the transfer pricing requirements 
currently incorporated into Schedule 25A do not lead to corporate confidence. In the words of the 
Australian Commissioner of Taxation: 'Any revenue system relies on the willingness of the community 
to by and large meet their obligations. People are more likely to do that if they understand the rationale 
for changes. Certainly they will not do it if they simply do not understand what the law requires of 
them.'48 Clarifying the 25A requirements consequently requires urgent attention. 
 
The OECD has expressed the view that clear procedural rules are necessary for three reasons.49 Firstly, 
to ensure the fair application of the arm's length principle, secondly to adequately protect the taxpayer 
and lastly to ensure that revenue is not shifted to countries with overly harsh procedural rules, thus 
resulting in pricing distortions. Increased guidance and clarity on what constitutes compliance is 
certainly required.50  
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 'Tax Reform: the lessons for tax administration in Australia' Address by Michael Carmody, 
Commissioner of Taxation to the American Chamber of Commerce, 2 May 2000, Sydney, 
NSW 1, 5. 
49 OECD Guidelines ¶ 4.4. 
50  'It is surprising, that no major country, apart from the US, has provided definitive 
legislative rules as to how its tax authorities will interpret the OECD guidelines. Canada has 
provided some assistance, but important trading nations such as the UK have produced little, 
if anything, of practical value. Why this is so is unclear: it may just be too difficult. In 
Australia, there are voluminous draft rulings which have emanated from the Australian 
Taxation Office…Although one should commend the ATO for attempting to publish guidance, 
it is fair to say that the literally thousands of words which they have so far written are little 
more than a repetition (in a far more verbose form) of the OECD guidelines. This is a lost 
opportunity as the ATO had the chance to lead with the US in providing real assistance to 
taxpayers. It is to be hoped that with the cooperation of the Australian professional bodies 
(including the Law Council of Australia, the Institute of Chartered Accountants and others) 
that the present draft rulings will be substantially revamped, possibly by way of myriad 
examples (following the US regulatory practice) and culminate in meaningful and pragmatic 
publications.' McLean, 'Transfer pricing' (1997) CFO Magazine Online 
http://www.cfoweb.com.au/stories/19970501/7183.asp.  
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The ATO would be well advised to propose for public consideration clear, definitive, workable, 
specific, fair and prospective rules that take a step-by-step approach. Such rules should make it clear to 
taxpayers what is expected for the determination of net income or loss from international business 
transactions between members of an MNE. Vague guidelines that can be interpreted in a myriad of 
different ways should be replaced with solid rules. This is especially important when an unwelcome 
side effect of complex rules with insufficient guidelines is a lack of consistency of application on the 
part of the tax administration. A corollary of the clarification of basic guidelines would be the 
coordination of penalty application, resulting in greater fairness in the system. 
 
Providing certainty of compliance as to what is required of taxpayers and thereby ensuring conformity 
and lessening the risk of audit activity benefits the resources employed by both taxpayers and tax 
authorities. This certainty as to general rules could be further enhanced by introducing global standards 
of transfer pricing documentation. 
 
Clarifying rules on a specific basis (according to the requirements of individual taxpayers) 
 
There is merit in a general list of useful information for determining transfer pricing, and tax 
administrations such as Australia and the US incorporate such elements to a certain degree into their 
documentation requirements. There is also value in clarifying these requirements by the provision of 
guidelines and extensive examples. Another useful tool here would be the introduction of a revenue 
database of 'frequently asked questions' on transfer pricing documentation made available to taxpayers 
via a website. This could be used to communicate a clear standard of conduct to taxpayers. 
 
However, because of the emphasis laid on individual circumstances, the production of an exhaustive 
global checklist would have the effect of imposing unnecessary work (and expense) on a number of 
taxpayers, and as far as the tax administration is concerned, the information would at best be useless 
and at worst, cause delays. Another reason why standardised documentation rules do not fully deal with 
the clarity issue is that, even where extensive guidance on the general documentation requirements is 
provided, taxpayers struggle with the particular problem of the dimension of the extensiveness of the 
information to be provided in their particular and perhaps unique circumstances.  
 
The OECD Guidelines do not specify the form that transfer pricing documentation should take, or offer 
a prototype. However, they do state, as a general proviso, that tax administrations must balance their 
need for documentation against the cost and administrative burden to the taxpayer of creating or 
obtaining them.51 In Australia, taxpayers are required to use their individual judgment, as each case 
will be dealt with on its individual facts and circumstances. They are warned that adequate 
documentation should be provided to avoid adjustments and penalties. The OECD states that the 
taxpayer should not be expected to have prepared or obtained documents beyond the minimum needed 
to make a reasonable assessment of whether it has complied with the arm's length principle52. This 
'minimum' will of course vary from taxpayer to taxpayer. It could be argued that the 'minimum' needed 
would be higher for taxpayer's engaging in inter-affiliate transfers of intangible products than for those 
transferring tangible products, for which there may be a greater number of comparables available. It 
would appear that the 'minimum' required would shift according to the individual taxpayer involved 
and the particular transactions engaged in. 
 
Echoing the OECD, the ATO 'does not expect taxpayers to prepare or obtain documents beyond the 
minimum needed to make a reasonable assessment of whether they have complied with the arm's 
length principle in setting prices or consideration,'53 with taxpayers using their 'commercial judgment' 
according to what a prudent business person would do in such circumstances. 
 
                                                          
51 OECD Guidelines ¶ 5.6. 
52 Ibid ¶ 5.7.  
53 Schedule 25A instructions 2003, Item 4 Adequacy of documentation 5. 
 12
It is submitted that requirements that refer to a standard of 'reasonableness', or to what constitutes the 
'minimum' necessary, which fluctuate according to the taxpayer's individual circumstances, violate the 
principle that tax legislation should be written with a clarity that allows taxpayers to consistently 
comply with the law (and not simply on a 'hit-and-miss' basis). Penalties that are applied according to 
whether the taxpayer has met their individual documentation requirements require an individualised 
solution. 
 
 
Recommendation: A 'One-Strike' Safe Harbour, With the Provision of Revenue Guidance 
 
It is suggested that a company should not be penalised on its initial presentation of any documentation, 
where certain specified steps have been taken. While this may be regarded as an excessively lenient 
approach, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of penalties is to punish intentional misconduct. 
They should not be used simply to raise revenue, as this undermines any belief in the fairness of the 
system. 
 
This more flexible approach is in line with a statement made by Australia's Deputy Commissioner to 
taxpayers in respect of their transfer pricing documentation: 'If you make a fair dinkum attempt to get it 
right we will not penalise you.'54  
 
If the information provided is insufficient or incorrect, the ATO should, in an educational notice, make 
it clear to the taxpayer exactly what documentation is required by that particular company, and in what 
depth. Such a notice should inform the taxpayer of the amount of the penalty if it had been assessed. It 
should also contain information on what steps the taxpayer should take to avoid the penalty in the 
future. Perhaps various templates of requirements could be drafted, which could be selected according 
to the needs of the individual taxpayer. The taxpayer should then be given sufficient time, tailored once 
again to their specific circumstances, to revise their documentation according to the requirements of the 
tax administration. 
 
Once the taxpayer has successfully presented the information to the ATO, it should be up to the 
taxpayer to maintain the specified records. If the specified mistakes are not subsequently amended, a 
penalty should be imposed. This 'one-strike' approach would encourage voluntary compliance by 
taxpayers. 
 
If, at a later date, there is a need for more in-depth or alternative information, the ATO should notify 
the taxpayer of this, again stating their specific documentation requirements. If the taxpayer 
subsequently fails to comply with documentation requirements due to a new set of facts and 
circumstances, the taxpayer's historical record of compliance should be taken into account when the 
imposition of a penalty is considered. Imposing penalties on taxpayers that have a good track record of 
compliance is counterproductive, as 'Assessing penalties against these taxpayers often contributes to 
the perception that the system is unfair and may not be conducive to encouraging voluntary 
compliance.'55 
 
The Australian Commissioner of Taxation has stated that: 
 
People also have a rightful expectation to be treated as human beings and have their different 
circumstances acknowledged in their personal dealings with us. Put simply by way of example, 
                                                          
54  Evans D 'Rewriting your books' CFO Magazine Online 
<http://www.cfoweb.com.au/stories/19980901/6096.asp> quoting Killaly J. 
55  Letter by Ely M H, National Partner-in-Charge, Tax Controversy Technical Services, 
KPMG & Gutman H L, Partner-in-Charge, Tax Legislative and Regulatory Services, 
Washington National Tax, KPMG, to the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on 
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Written Comments on Taxpayer's Rights, 
April 2, 2001 (107th Congress, 1st Session)  1, 3. 
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people who have paid their taxes on time for years and slip up once do not expect to be treated 
the same as determined, habitual non-payers.56 
 
This individually tailored approach to documentation requirements will initially place heavy demands 
on revenue resources, but there would be immense long-term benefits. Once the comprehensive 
educational notice has been supplied to the taxpayer, the penalty system will become much easier to 
administer, and will have the added benefits of clarity and fairness.  
 
It should be mentioned that there is evidence that both parent companies and subsidiaries are becoming 
increasingly aware of the importance of maintaining appropriate transfer pricing documentation, and 
are therefore likely to be highly aware of the need to submit comprehensive returns.57 
 
 
 
The PATA Agreement 
 
Having examined some of the problems associated with Australia's national practices in the transfer 
pricing documentation realm, this paper will now look at a new initiative with regards to the 
harmonisation of documentation requirements, of which Australia is a member. The efficacy of this 
undertaking will be examined, along with potential problems that may be encountered. 
 
Transfer pricing experts have frequently commented on the difference between tax authority thinking, 
which is national in focus, compared with MNE commercial thinking, which is global in focus.58 
Domestic tax systems set up for domestic purposes are poorly designed to handle the global activities 
of MNEs, and conflict seems inevitable as domestic tax authorities grapple for their 'fair' share of the 
profits of MNEs demonstrating an increasingly mobile tax base. 
 
Now, however, an initiative to create principles for uniform transfer pricing documentation has been 
formulated by PATA, an inter-governmental tax organisation whose members are Australia, Canada, 
Japan and the United States. The proposed documentation package was released in June 2002, along 
with an invitation for public comment. This was followed, in March 2003, by a revised agreement. 
 
The 2003 revision clarified that no penalties would be imposed on taxpayers complying with the PATA 
principles.59 This is a tremendous breakthrough in the transfer pricing arena. On the other hand, it also 
specified that even where these principles are complied with, the PATA tax administrations may still 
make transfer pricing adjustments and assess any interest due on those adjustments.60  This is an 
unusual inclusion, as transfer pricing documentation is usually designed to afford protection against 
both penalties and adjustments.61 The stated motivation behind this uniform package is that one set of 
transfer pricing documentation would be sufficient for all PATA members, and thus save the 
                                                          
56 'Tax Reform: the lessons for tax administration in Australia' Address by Michael Carmody, 
above n 48, 4. 
57 Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey, above n 4, 19. The survey reports 
that nearly two-thirds of parent companies see the maintenance of appropriate transfer pricing 
documentation as more important than they did two years ago, along with 56 per cent of 
subsidiary respondents.  
58 Pagan J C & Scott Wilkie J Transfer Pricing Strategy In A Global Economy (1993) IBFD 
Publications Amsterdam,  ¶ 1.31. 
59  Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Package, 
http://www.ato.gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.asp?doc=/content/30275.htm&page=1, last 
modified Tuesday, March 11, 2003  1. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ossi GJ, Chung K & Sidher SJ 'The search for consistency: A global approach to transfer 
pricing' 32 Tax Management International Journal (13 Jun 2003) 283, 290. 
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duplication of costs. The PATA members consider the package to be consistent with the principles 
espoused in Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines. 
 
The use of the so-called PATA Documentation Package (the 'Package') is voluntary, but if a taxpayer 
chooses to use the PATA Documentation Package in order to avoid the imposition of transfer pricing 
penalties in relation to an international inter-affiliate transaction, three operative principles need to be 
satisfied.  
 
Firstly, MNEs need to make reasonable efforts to ensure that their transfer prices are established in 
compliance with the arm's length principle. Such 'reasonable efforts' are to be determined by each 
PATA member tax administration. They include, but are not limited to, an analysis of controlled 
transactions, searches for comparable uncontrolled transactions (ie comparable transactions between 
independent enterprises dealing at arm's length), and the selection and application of arm's length 
methodologies 'reasonably concluded to produce arm's length results in accordance with PATA 
member transfer pricing rules and the relevant treaty, consistent with the OECD Guidelines.'62 A 
problem here is that as these reasonable efforts appear to be country specific, it does not seem likely 
that one set of documentation may in fact be uniformly applied across the four tax jurisdictions.  
 
Another difficulty in relation to the arm's length methodologies requirement is the Package's stated 
consistency with the OECD Guidelines. The OECD and the US, a PATA member, have notoriously 
differing views with regards to the appropriateness of certain arm's length methodologies. While the 
official position of the US is that its final transfer pricing regulations are consistent with the OECD 
Guidelines, some OECD member countries disagree. This has had the unfortunate result that MNEs 
risk antagonising certain revenue authorities if they undertake what appears to be a US transfer pricing 
approach. Multinational taxpayers are therefore compelled 'to account for multiple and sometime[s] 
disparate rules when setting, documenting, and defending cross-border transfer prices.'63 
 
A prime example of the different approaches to transfer pricing methodologies is the US preference for 
the Comparable Profits Method (CPM). The OECD, on the other hand, is hostile to this methodology 
and instead requires the use of the Transactional Net Margin Method, or TNMM. Different economic 
data and comparability standards are used to support these two transfer pricing methodologies, and this 
may lead to different results. An MNE utilising the PATA Package would therefore need to take into 
account the taxing authorities' differing transfer pricing methodology preferences and practices. This 
would also appear to detract from the touted advantage of the 'uniformity' of documentation required 
by PATA members.  
 
What constitutes 'reasonable efforts' needs to be clearly defined in the Package. As with Schedule 25A, 
without such clarification taxpayers are left in the invidious position of trying to second-guess how 
these terms will be interpreted. This may discourage taxpayers from utilising the PATA Package.64  
 
According to the second operative principle, MNEs must maintain contemporaneous documentation of 
their efforts to comply with the arm's length principle. The PATA Documentation Package includes a 
schedule describing the documentation necessary to satisfy this principle. It specifies that transfer 
pricing documentation prepared and maintained pursuant to this Package must be "adequate and of 
sufficient quality." The quality of this data will be evaluated by each PATA member tax administration, 
taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the extent to which reliable data 
was reasonably available and analysed in a reasonable manner. The significance, importance and 
complexity of the taxpayer's transfer pricing issues will also be taken into account. Thus both 
quantitative and qualitative standards are imposed by means of this second principle. Again, the terms 
"adequate and of sufficient quality" and "reasonable manner" are not clearly defined, and require 
clarification to provide taxpayers with certainty. 
 
                                                          
62 PATA Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, above n 59, 2. 
63  Chip W W 'Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines' in 
Feinschreiber R (ed) Transfer Pricing Handbook (3rd ed, 2001) John Wiley & Sons Inc New 
York  33-3. 
64 Lebovitz M S et al 'Achieving transfer pricing com-pata-bility' (Sep 2003) 14 Journal of 
International Taxation 14, 17.  
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The schedule sets out the transfer pricing documentation to be provided by taxpayers by means of a list 
of documents that is, according to the Package, 'considered to be exhaustive'65. In other words, it is 
seen to encompass all documents necessary to avoid transfer pricing penalties being imposed by the 
PATA tax administrations, although it is acknowledged that not all of these documents may be 
necessary in every transfer pricing transaction.  
 
In fact, MNEs may find the PATA documentation list to be more onerous to comply with than the local 
transfer pricing regulations. International tax practitioners have compared the PATA Documentation 
Package with US documentation requirements, generally accepted to impose the most burdensome 
demands of all jurisdictions. They have found that: 'Not only is the level of detail in the PATA Package 
requirements much greater than the documentation requirements under the Section 6662(e) regulations, 
but the amount of information that must be provided is also greater.' 66  For example, the final 
documentation list issued in March 2003 not only requires the maintenance of copies of annual reports 
and financial reports for the year to which the Package relates, but also for the prior five years.67  
 
Furthermore, although an extensive schedule is provided, the Package stipulates that in examining the 
arm's length nature of an MNE's interaffiliate transactions, additional information that is not listed on 
the schedule may be requested by a PATA member tax administration.68 This would seem to contradict 
the 'exhaustive' nature of the schedule. Although the Package claims to be a response to the difficulties 
and costs which MNEs face in order to meet the transfer pricing documentation standards of the 
different jurisdiction, it actually imposes the most onerous documentation requirements of all. 
 
 
Under the third operative principle, MNEs need to produce documentation requested by a PATA 
member tax administrator in a timely manner. Again, there is no definition of the term 'timely manner' 
in the Package, and it may therefore be concluded that this term may vary between the four PATA 
jurisdictions.69 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Tax Executives Institute 70  (TEI) has outlined three goals that any useful and efficient 
documentation Package should serve.71 Firstly, it should provide taxpayers with certainty about the 
minimum standards that they must satisfy, especially to avoid penalties. Secondly, it should be flexible 
enough for taxpayers to be able to tailor the required documentation to their facts and circumstances, 
and finally it should minimise costly duplicative administrative and recordkeeping requirements.  
 
Although any initiative to provide a common documentation framework should be encouraged, on 
analysis it would appear that the PATA Package does not at present optimally meet the above three 
goals of certainty, flexibility and cost-saving. Although it provides an MNE with certainty in relation to 
the avoidance of the imposition of transfer pricing penalties, no such certainty is provided in relation to 
transfer pricing adjustments. The observation has been made that local transfer pricing examiners 
would tend to be biased (either consciously or unconsciously) in favour of documentation meeting 
local requirements. As the PATA Package differs from the local rules imposed by the four member 
                                                          
65 PATA Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, above n 59, 3. 
66Lebovitz et al, above n 64, 17. 
67  PATA Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, above n 59, 'Nature of the 
business/industry and market conditions'.   
68 Ibid 3. 
69  Ernst & Young 'Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing 
documentation package released' (April 2003) Transfer Pricing Brief  1, 2. 
70 The Tax Executives Institute is the preeminent association of business tax executives. Its 
5,300 professionals manage the tax affairs of 2,800 of the leading companies in Canada, the 
United States and Europe.  
71 Letter submitted on September 5, 2002, by TEI President Drew Glennie to Carol Dunahoo, 
Director of International for the Internal Revenue Service, above n 2, 3-4.  
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states, the end result may be that it may 'decrease the exposure to penalties and at the same time 
increase exposure to adjustments.'72 
 
 
While the Package has furnished taxpayers with a schedule of documentation to be supplied which is 
more onerous than national documentation requirements, an element of uncertainty remains in that 
additional information may still be required. There is also a failure to define certain critical terms, 
leaving them open to individual interpretation by the PATA members. Tax practitioners have expressed 
their disappointment that: 
 
None of the PATA members have agreed, under this revised package, to a single standard for 
either the application of the arm's length principle, 'reasonable efforts' or time limits for the 
production of transfer pricing documentation. These factors will continue to be governed by 
local law, regulation and practice.73 
 
There is further uncertainty concerning the application of the OECD Guidelines, especially in relation 
to its stated preferences in terms of transfer pricing methodologies. Strict compliance with these 
Guidelines would tend to indicate an inability to meet the second criterion of flexibility. As the US is a 
PATA member state, this problem requires urgent attention.  
 
The imposition of ten general categories of documentation and 48 specific bullet points in the PATA 
documentation schedule requires taxpayers to prepare and maintain documentation that may not be 
required for normal business purposes or under local transfer pricing regulations. This, too, denotes a 
lack of flexibility. Although the Package acknowledges that in certain circumstances some of the 
documents would not be needed, further guidance is required here. 
 
The PATA Package describes itself as a response to the potential difficulties that an MNE may face in 
preparing transfer pricing documentation which complies with the laws and administrative 
requirements of multiple tax jurisdictions, including costly duplicative administrative requirements. On 
examination, it would seem that although the PATA Package provides a common documentation 
framework, it does not facilitate transfer pricing documentation that can be uniformly applied in all 
PATA jurisdictions, as domestic transfer pricing requirements will still need to be complied with.  
 
Diverging national interpretations of taxpayer compliance with the arm's length standard coupled with 
a penchant among revenue authorities for idiosyncratic local substantive transfer pricing rules mean 
that transfer pricing documentation costs are unlikely to be minimised. It is submitted that a reduction 
in both complexity and compliance costs would best be achieved by imposing uniformity across 
national borders, ie by harmonising the substantive transfer pricing rules of the member states.  
 
The adoption of a consistent transnational transfer pricing policy is a worthwhile and necessary goal for 
revenue authorities around the world. Australia's role in the PATA Package initiative is to be 
commended, and may be viewed as a step along the way to the harmonisation of the members' transfer 
pricing regimes. However, the consensus among transfer pricing practitioners would appear to be that 
more work needs to be done to clarify areas of uncertainty: 'While the PATA effort is commendable, at 
this point in time the Documentation Package leaves too many questions unanswered for it to serve 
fully its goal of providing a practical framework for producing uniform documentation.'74  
 
Recommendations for the future 
At present, two-thirds of the relevant parent companies and subsidiaries have not finally determined 
whether or not they will utilise the PATA Package for their transfer pricing documentation.75 Of the 
one-third that have reached a decision, the majority has decided not to use it. From this it can be 
concluded that MNEs need some incentives to take advantage of this new initiative. It is therefore 
                                                          
72 Ossi et al, above n 61, 291. 
73  Ernst & Young 'Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing 
documentation package released' above n 69, 3. 
74 Ossi et al, above n 61, 290. 
75 Ernst & Young Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Report, above n 4, 21. 
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recommended that the certainty, flexibility and cost-effectiveness of the PATA Package be increased 
by reviewing and updating certain features. 
In order to increase certainty, terms such as 'reasonable efforts', 'reasonable manner' and 'adequate and 
of sufficient quality' should no longer be interpreted in a country-specific, but in a country-inclusive 
manner, ie the PATA members should agree on and clearly define an interpretation of these terms for 
all their members. Likewise, a unified approach to the application of the arm's length standard, and to 
the time limits for the production of documents should be adopted. While this may be seen as a tall 
order, it should be borne in mind that there are only four PATA members, that they have already gone a 
long way to reach consensus on a number of issues in order to conclude the present PATA Package, 
and that it is in their mutual interest to increase the utilisation of the PATA Package in order to 
conserve revenue resources. 
Cost-effectiveness could be increased by streamlining the documentation requirements, perhaps via 
PATA templates of minimum documentation requirements for certain industries or types of 
transactions.  The present schedule of documentation includes much information that is difficult to find 
and irrelevant to the business management of MNEs. The focus should rather be on documentation that 
will be of material value, ie highly relevant to the member tax administrations in evaluating transfer 
pricing transactions. Where particular taxpayers need to provide more essential information, they could 
be notified and allowed sufficient time to produce this.  
Increased flexibility could be introduced in relation to transfer pricing methodologies, by specifically 
incorporating US-approved methodologies into the PATA-approved methodologies. 
The PATA members could also reduce taxpayer exposure to transfer pricing adjustments by sending 
individual taxpayers a warning of the potential for an adjustment after reviewing their documentation, 
along with revision guidelines. Taxpayers should then be given the opportunity to implement these 
documentation revisions, rather than tax administrations simply making an adjustment and imposing 
interest. As with the recommendations made for improving Australia's local transfer pricing 
documentation regime, the emphasis should be on taxpayer education, and on 'mechanising' future 
compliance in order to reduce costs to all parties. 
While the abovementioned recommendations admittedly endorse a more broad-brush, flexible 
approach to transfer pricing documentation, they represent an opportunity for PATA to reduce the 
current documentation burden on trade between their members, promote greater efficiency and thus 
benefit member tax administrations and taxpayers alike. In the words of the Australian Commissioner 
of Taxation: 
Compliance management is not simply about audits, verification and enforcement. It is also 
about supporting people in meeting their obligations and making it as easy as possible for 
those seeking to do the right thing.76 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 'The 2004-05 Compliance Program' Michael Carmody, above n 10, 7. 
